Labor Law by Teple, Edwin R.
Case Western Reserve Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Edwin R. Teple, Labor Law, 10 Wes. Res. L. Rev. 421 (1959)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol10/iss3/19
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
Insurable Interest - Ownership Not A Necessity
As part of a divorce proceeding the husband was ordered to pay a
specified sum of alimony and support of the children, subject to "the
further order of the court"; and to pay certain other expenses. Title to
the household goods was given to the wife. The husband carried a
policy of fire insurance which covered loss of such household goods and
the clothing of the children. Loss by fire occurred and the husband sued
to recover. Against the argument of the company, the court held that
the husband had an insurable interest in these items. Ownership is not
necessary for existence of an insurable interest. A change of circum-
stances affecting adversely the economics status of his children and his
former wife, would, in all probability, result in a modification of the
court's order of support because the father is charged with reasonable
support. Consequently, the loss of the goods through fire damage would,
potentially, put upon the father an additional burden. This is sufficient
to give him an insurable interest in the goods. 4
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LABOR LAW
The most interesting decision during the past year was rendered by
the Supreme Court in the case of Perko v. Local No. 207, International
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers.'
This was an action by a foreman to recover damages for an alleged
wrongful interference with the plaintiff's right to work.2 Plaintiffs peti-
tion alleged that the union and certain of its officials had conspired
against him to deprive him of his right to continue working as foreman
for his most recent employer or any other company in the geographic
area served by the Local, by suspending his foreman's rights and demand-
ing his discharge. A strike was instituted, it was said, to enforce the
demand, and plaintiff was discharged. The common pleas court dismissed
the action on defendant's motion, for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. This judgment was sustained by the court of appeals.
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff was
entitled to maintain the action and overruled the lower courts. Since this
was an action for damages for a common law tort, the court reasoned
that its maintenance was not precluded by the fact that the union had
also committed an unfair labor practice within the terms of the Labor
14. Stauder v. Associated General Fire Co., 105 Ohio App. 105, 151 N.E.2d 583
(1957).
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Management Relations Act, relying upon the recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in the Russell and Gonzales cases. 3 Neither
was the action precluded by plaintiffs failure to first exhaust the reme-
dies allegedly provided by the union constitution and bylaws. The court
pointed out that the plaintiff was not asking for reinstatement or other
equitable relief, that it was not established that internal remedies had
been provided for the consideration of damage claims, and that such a
course would be vain and futile under the circumstances of this case in
any event.4
This decision falls within one of the biggest chinks in the federal
pre-emption doctrine, and is clearly supported by the two cases cited. The
utilization of the state forum for damage actions in cases of this kind ap-
pears to be developing into a popular trend. The availability of this
means of protecting the rights of the individual, be he member or non-
member, may well become one of the most significant modern develop-
ments in the law of labor relations. For one thing, it may help to dem-
onstrate that legislative action to outlaw the union shop and other forms
of union security provisions, are unnecessary. Damage awards could be
a powerful force in discouraging improper union action. At the same
time, the ultimate value of this device may depend in large measure upon
its judicious application, for, as has been recently pointed out, substantial
harm to the union movement could result.5 It remains to be seen how
far this trend will carry.
1. 168 Ohio St. 161, 151 N.E.2d 742 (1958). See discussion in ADMrNsTRATIv E
LAW section, supra and TORTS section, infra.
2. It seems clear enough from the allegations of the petition that there had been
an interference with plaintiff's contract of employment, but whether such interfer-
ence gives rise to an actionable wrong beyond this (with respect to other employers
in the area) is another matter. For a discussion of the so-called "right to work," see,
Teple, A Closer Look at "Right to Work" Legislation, 9 WEST. RES. L. REV. 5
(1957).
3. U.A.W. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) in which it was said that the availa-
bility of partial relief under the federal act does not deprive a person of his common
law right of action in tort for all damages suffered. IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617
(1958), in which it was held that nothing in the federal Labor Management Rela-
tions Act deprives the state of power to award damages for loss of wages to a union
member expelled in violation of his rights under the union constitution (mandatory
reinstatement was also recognized as a remedy available under California law).
4. Futility is one of the recognized exceptions to the rule that courts normally will
not entertain actions based upon alleged wrongful expulsion until the internal rem-
edies have first been exhausted. The exception is applied, for instance, when the
same individuals who file the charges will sit in judgment when the matter comes
up for hearing under the procedure provided within the union structure. See,
MATHEws, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 915-16 (1953); Crossen v. Duffy,
90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769 (1951).
5. Smoot, Staggering Punitive Damages Against Labor Unions, 7 CLEV. MAR. L.
Uune
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
The remaining cases reported in 1958 involved injunctions against
picketing. This remains the most prolific source of litigation in this
field of law, and the most recent decisions serve to further define the
Ohio rule regarding the right to picket.
In P. & S. Operating Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters and Paper Hang-
ers of America, Dist. Council No. 12,8 recognition picketing by strangers
was again held to be unlawful by the Ohio Supreme Court. A motion
picture theater operator had brought action for damages and for an in-
junction to restrain the picketing. Defendant's demurrer was sustained in
common pleas and the court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, one judge dissenting.7 The public policy of the
State of Ohio, it was said, precluded picketing by persons never employed
by the employer, the sole purpose of which was to bring pressure upon
the employer to compel his employees to join the union.8 There was no
dispute between the employer and his employees, and the union did not
represent anyone ever employed there.
In Brown v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,9 on the other hand, em-
ployees of the store definitely were involved and yet the same result was
reached. The injunction sought by the employer against the picketing
union was granted.'0
Twelve grocery clerks had signed union membership application
cards, and when the employer still refused to recognize the union these
employees, along with some others, walked out. All but two subsequent-
ly returned, however, and renounced the union in petitions presented to
the employer on two different occasions. The applications for member-
ship had never been accepted by the union, but the fact remained that
REV. 524 (1958). This writer stresses the importance of the punitive damages
which the state court judgments included in both the Russell and Gonzales cases.
6. 168 Ohio St. 73, 151 N.E.2d 364 (1958).
7. Judge Zimmerman, without opinion, declined to adopt the majority view. In
his dissenting opinion in the earlier case of Chucales v. Royalty, 164 Ohio St. 214,
129 N.E.2d 823 (1955), discussed in the 1955 Survey, 7 WEST. RES. L RSV. 295
(1956), he had already expressed himself rather well.
8. The majority specifically approved and followed the earlier decisions in Crosby
v. Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N.E.2d 934 (1940) and Chucales v. Royalty, supra.,
note 7. It is dear by this time that the court has deliberately chosen to ignore the
distinction between Crosby and the later decisions, the picketing having been ac-
companied by violence in the former but not in the latter. The court also reiterated
its view that the policy of a state may be established as well by judicial pronounce-
ments of the common law as by legislative enactment. The former, of course, has
the advantage of considerably greater flexibility.
9. 148 N.B.2d 357 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
10. This decision was affirmed in 148 N.E.2d 360 (1957), appeal dismissed,
167 Ohio St. 28, 145 N.E.2d 536 (1957).
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two of the employees continued to take part in the picketing. The court
in this case reasoned that there was no dispute at the time of the action,
between the employer and 851% of his employees, and that the only griev-
ance of the two who remained on strike was the employer's refusal to
negotiate and sign an agreement with the union. This was construed,
therefore, to be an attempt to require the employer to recognize the union
against the wishes of most of the employees, which was held to be unlaw-
ful as against the public policy of the state.
Like the decision in Anderson v. Local 698,11 reported and discussed
in the 1957 Survey,1" this is clearly an extension of the rule established
by the Supreme Court. The question is whether the Supreme Court will
allow this trend to continue, and if so, how far. If these two decisions
are correct, as a practical matter, any picketing by less than a majority of
the employees of the establishment is just as unlawful as stranger picket-
ing.
In Faxon Hills Construction Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of America,13 defendant union conducted a campaign for sup-
port among the employees and then called a strike when the employer
refused to negotiate. The employer first filed an unfair practice charge,
stating that commerce was affected within the meaning of the federal act,
but the N.L.R.B. refused to take jurisdiction. Suit was then instituted
in the common pleas court to enjoin the picketing which attended the
strike. The injunction was granted, but the court of appeals dismissed
the petition and dissolved the injunction on the ground that the lower
court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Supreme Court
held that an allegation in an unfair practice charge filed with the N.L.R.B.
that interstate commerce was affected, is only a legal conclusion and not
conclusive as to the actual existence of such an effect so as to preclude
an Ohio court from having jurisdiction, particularly where the federal
agency refuses to assert jurisdiction and no other evidence appears as to
the effect on commerce.1 4 The decision of the court of appeals was re-
versed.
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11. 101 Ohio App. 542, 140 N.E.2d 432 (1956), appeal dismissed, 165 Ohio St.
512, 137 N.E.2d 752 (1956).
12. 9 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 338, 340 (1958).
13. 168 Ohio St. 8, 151 N.E.2d 12 (1958).
14. The court explained that a statement of fact in a pleading, which is material
and competent, constitutes a judicial admission, but it must be one of fact and not
merely a legal conclusion. The allegation of a conclusion, it was pointed out, binds
neither the pleader nor the court.
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